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Reliance on attentional set contributes to decreased detection of unexpected events. 
 
Distraction leads to longer reaction times for unexpected events, even when they are congruent with 
driving 
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The impact of attentional set and situation awareness on dual tasking driving performance 
 
Abstract 
 
The impact of attentional set and situation awareness on event detection and reaction times was 
investigated in 2 simulated driving experiments. Experiment 1: thirty participants viewed and reacted 
to thirty driving films containing unexpected items which were either driving congruent or 
incongruent. Group 1 completed the task without distraction; group 2 completed a concurrent 
conversation task. Experiment 2: thirty participants viewed and reacted to twenty driving films which 
contained unexpected yet driving relevant events. Half of the participants completed the task without 
distraction and half completed a concurrent conversation task. Measures of event detection and 
reaction time were recorded for both experiments. Compared to undistracted participants, dual-
taskers reacted to fewer unexpected events; recorded longer reaction times; and reacted to fewer 
incongruent and peripheral events, suggesting an enduring attentional set for driving. Dual tasking 
drivers may adopt a strategy of over-reliance on schema-driven processing when attention is shared 
between tasks.  
 
Keywords: attentional set, schemas, dual tasking, cognitive workload, driving, situation awareness 
 
Statement of relevance: Dual tasking whilst driving raises significant safety concerns. Identification of 
the attention allocation strategies employed by dual tasking drivers may help to explain why driving 
performance deteriorates when a secondary task is introduced. This research suggests that the 
application of a schema-driven attentional set, when cognitive workload is increased by a secondary 
task, can lead to failures in visual perception and decreased driving performance.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
There is overwhelming evidence that driver distraction (defined as anything that draws attention away 
from the primary task of driving, Regan, Lee & Young, 2008) impairs driving performance and is a 
major factor in road accidents (see Atchley, Tran & Salehinejad, 2017 for an extensive review of 
distraction-related research, using a wide variety of methodologies). Activities such as texting are 
obviously risky because they require the driver to look away from the road and take their hands off 
the steering wheel. However, even if the driver's eyes are on the road and their hands are on the 
wheel, an activity such as mobile phone use has been shown to be dangerously distracting because it 
takes the driver's mind away from driving. In the absence of detailed normative data on the 
prevalence and duration of distractions, it is difficult to accurately assess their riskiness. Possibly the 
best risk estimates so far come from Dingus et al's (2016) case-control study of naturalistic driving. 
Data recorded from 3,500 drivers of instrumented cars over a three-year period provided information 
on the contribution of distraction to 905 crashes.  Overall, drivers were found to be engaging in 
distracting activities for more than half of the time they were driving, doubling their risk of crashing 
compared to when they were driving undistracted. Different distractors were associated with different 
levels of risk. Interacting with devices such as touchscreens increased the risk of a crash approximately 
five-fold. Using a hand-held mobile phone was associated with an approximately four-fold increase in 
crash risk, which is highly consistent with the findings of an early study by Redelmeier and Tibshirani 
(1997) on increased risk of accidents amongst phone-using drivers. 
 
These epidemiological data are consistent with a large body of research findings showing that drivers 
conversing on a phone - whether hand-held or hands-free - show significant impairments in driving 
performance. The behavioural manifestations of mobile phone use whilst driving are now well 
documented: drivers notice fewer hazards, and are slower to respond to the ones that they do detect 
3 
 
(Strayer, Drews and Johnson, 2003; Strayer & Drews, 2007; Hyman et al., 2009; Fisher and Strayer, 
2014; Strayer and Fisher, 2016).  As Young, Salmon and Cornelissen (2013) point out, the aim of 
research now should be to develop theoretical models of why these deficits occur, elucidating the 
underlying cognitive and perceptual processes responsible for them. The concept of Situation 
Awareness (SA) is potentially very useful in this context. There are many definitions, conceptions and 
models of SA, and this is not the place for a detailed evaluation of them (see e.g. Salmon et al., 2008, 
Salmon, Stanton & Young, 2012; Endsley, 2000, 2015,; Plant & Stanton, 2016). For the purposes of this 
paper, we use Smith and Hancock's (1995) definition, that SA is ‘At a very simple level, an appropriate 
awareness of a situation (p.146)’ (noting, as they do, that the emphasis is on ‘appropriate’, since not 
all elements of a situation will need to be attended to).  
 
Endsley's (1995) model of SA is also relevant here. It postulates the existence of three levels: 
perception (Level 1), comprehension (Level 2) and projection (Level 3). Subsequent models (e.g. Smith 
and Hancock, 1995) have emphasised the cyclical nature of these processes, in line with Neisser's 
(1976) ‘Perceptual Cycle Model’, and questioned the apparent hierarchical relationship between them 
that is implied by calling them ‘levels’. Nevertheless, at a descriptive level, Endsley's (1995) model 
corresponds well with the tasks that drivers have to perform in order to function effectively. An 
experienced, undistracted driver needs to rapidly acquire information relevant to the primary driving 
tasks of navigation and hazard-avoidance. Full SA requires a detailed, accurate and up to date mental 
model of the driving environment as it is now, and how it is likely to be in the near future. Drivers 
cannot merely respond to events as and when they occur. Therefore a vital aspect of their mental 
model is prediction of what is likely to happen next, based on the current state of the driving 
environment. Drivers need to evaluate information, and use it to plan what they will do next as well as 
what other road-users are likely to do. Driving is a fast-paced and fast-changing activity, so the 
evaluation of information and execution of plans are likely to change the nature of the information 
that the driver needs to obtain, from moment to moment, which in turn will change the plans, and so 
on. 
 
Many aspects of the behaviour of mobile phone-using drivers are consistent with the idea that they 
show reduced SA: (1) They make fewer eye-movements, which are largely restricted to the area 
immediately ahead (Recarte and Nunes, 2000; Victor, Harbluk & Engstrom 2005; Briggs, Hole and 
Land, 2016). This means they are less able to detect any potential hazards that might occur to the 
sides of the vehicle (such as a pedestrian about to step into the road) because they are not scanning 
these regions. (2) Even though their eyes are positioned straight ahead, drivers show reduced 
awareness of information from that direction, due to ‘inattentional blindness’: visual imagery from the 
phone conversation competes with the external world for processing resources, increasing the risk of 
inattentional blindness (Mack and Rock, 1998) and hence ‘looked but failed to see’ errors (Strayer & 
Drews 2007; Briggs et al. 2016; Bergen et al. 2013). (3) In order to maintain performance in what are 
seen as the ‘primary’ tasks in driving, such as lane-keeping and collision avoidance, drivers divert 
resources from other tasks (cf. Hockey's 1997 ‘compensatory control’ model, 1997). They drive slower 
(sometimes inappropriately so, compared with the rest of the traffic), and use their indicators and 
mirrors less (Reed & Robbins, 2008). Reduced use of mirrors means that they are largely unaware of 
the state of the traffic behind them.  
 
A few studies have examined SA in distracted drivers. For example, in their driving simulator study 
Heenan et al (2014) found that conversation impaired drivers' SA more for vehicles located behind the 
driver than for those that were ahead. Gugerty, Rakauskas and Brooks (2004) and Ma and Kaber 
(2005) questioned participants to probe their SA as they drove in a simulator. In both studies, drivers 
who were also conversing showed poorer SA than undistracted drivers. As such, an interesting issue is 
how a mobile phone-using driver can achieve any semblance of SA when their processing resources 
are also being used for maintaining a conversation: both activities are processing-intensive and 
4 
 
therefore are likely, in combination, to exceed the driver's processing capacity. The answer may lie in 
the fact that for an experienced driver, aspects of vehicle control are fairly automatized (Shinar, Meir 
& Ben-Shoham, 1998)), and the driving environment is generally quite predictable. A clear set of rules 
dictates how drivers should behave (e.g., keep to one side of the road, stop at red traffic lights, give 
way at junctions, etc.). Most of the time, these rules are followed by vehicle users and pedestrians. 
The predictability of the driving environment and the highly repetitive nature of many driving 
scenarios are both factors that encourage road-users to make extensive use of schemas. As with SA, 
the concept of ’schema’ has many subtly different definitions, but essentially schemas are mental 
templates of situations that are based on repeated prior encounters with similar events. Norman and 
Shallice's (1986) model of executive control suggests that many routine behaviours could be 
performed by recruiting appropriate schemas. They suggest that a relatively low-level process called 
‘contention scheduling’ activates schemas in response to appropriate environmental triggers, with 
higher-level executive processes intervening only if the situation is unusual, or if schemas need to be 
overridden for some reason. Neisser's (1976) Perceptual Cycle Model emphasises how schemas can 
facilitate interaction with the world: they guide the processes of perception and attention that acquire 
information about the environment. This information then modifies and updates the schemas, in a 
cyclical process. Schemas encourage the use of an ‘attentional set’, a bias to search for task-relevant 
sensory information whilst paying less attention to task-irrelevant information. Thus, in normal driving 
an individual is likely to pay more attention to road signs, relevant to driving, than to names of shops 
that they pass, which are irrelevant to the task at hand. 
 
Most research to date has investigated the use of schema-driven attentional set in undistracted 
drivers. The use of schemas has benefits for drivers in terms of reducing their mental workload and 
enabling them to focus on information that is relevant to their current situation. However, reliance on 
schemas has potential costs too; if the schema encourages the use of an inaccurate or inadequate 
attentional set, the end result can be diminished SA. An attentional set can lead to a biased selection 
of information for processing whilst other, highly relevant, information goes unnoticed (Fracker, 
1988). Indeed, once an ‘attentional set’ has been selected, it may not be continually evaluated to 
ensure it is the most efficient strategy to employ (Leber and Egeth, 2006), potentially leading to 
reduced SA. For example, the attentional set that allows for efficient driving in an open-road 
environment may not be appropriate in an urban environment, but a driver may not switch strategies 
when moving from one to the other. When a secondary task is introduced, in order to reduce 
distraction, drivers may be even less likely to change their attentional set (Bacon and Egeth, 1994; 
Pammer and Blink, 2012). 
 
An early example of the costs of an inappropriate attentional set comes from a study by Hole and 
Tyrell (1995). After repeated exposure to images of traffic scenes depicting motorcyclists using 
daytime headlights, drivers were slow to respond to an unlit motorcyclist. Some even failed to detect 
him altogether. This implies that the drivers were looking for headlights rather than motorcyclists per 
se. This induced attentional set was effective for rapid detection of headlight-using motorcyclists, 
(obviating the need to process perceptual information from the oncoming motorcyclist in any detail) 
but at a cost of reducing the detectability of unlit motorcyclists. In a driving simulator study, Most and 
Astur (2007) similarly induced an attentional set by asking participants to follow signposts, with yellow 
and blue arrows on them, at ten junctions on the route. Half of the participants were instructed to 
follow the yellow arrows (inducing a yellow attentional set) and half were instructed to follow the blue 
arrows (blue attentional set). At the tenth junction a motorcycle, which was either yellow or blue in 
colour, unexpectedly swerved into the path of the participant’s vehicle and then stopped. Participants 
were required to react to this event by braking in order to avoid a collision. When the colour of the 
motorcycle was incongruent with the participant's attentional set, braking latencies were on average 
186ms longer than when the bike matched the attentional set. Furthermore, 36% of the participants in 
the incongruent condition collided with the motorcycle compared with only 7% in the congruent 
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condition. Most and Astur (2007) argue that this demonstrates the strength of an individual’s 
attentional set and its ability to decrease SA, resulting in deteriorated driving.  
 
Borowsky et al. (2008) looked at the role of experience in the development of schemas, by presenting 
experienced and novice drivers with images in which they varied the position of road signs. Signs were 
either shown on the correct (right) or incorrect (left) side of the road. Experienced drivers were both 
more likely to notice the road signs presented on the correct side of the road, and less likely to detect 
those on the incorrect side of the road. Novice drivers were unaffected by the positioning of the signs. 
Borowsky et al. (2008) claim that experienced drivers had a clear attentional set which novice drivers 
were yet to develop. This notion is supported by similar investigations looking at the effects on hazard 
detection of variation in driving environment (urban vs. residential). More recently, Salmon, Young 
and Cornelissen (2013) have used the schema concept (together with SA) in order to understand why 
conflicts occur between different groups of road-users. They showed that motorcyclists, cyclists and 
car-drivers had very different, and incompatible, schemas about junctions. The drivers' schemas were 
‘car-centric’, leading them to direct their attention towards sampling other cars in their environment, 
rather than looking for cycles and motorcycles. Their predisposition to look for other cars led them to 
attend more to the regions ahead and behind the car, rather than to the sides, where cyclists and 
motorcyclists were likely to be positioned (see also Walker, Stanton & Salmon 2011; Salmon, Young & 
Cornelissen 2013). 
 
As mentioned earlier, all of these studies have investigated the use of schemas and attentional set in 
undistracted drivers. They do not consider the added cognitive workload imposed by the introduction 
of a secondary task. Laboratory-based research on ’inattentional blindness’ (Mack and Rock, 1998) 
suggests that when attention is focused on one task, unexpected yet salient items in a scene can go 
unnoticed, particularly if they share common features (e.g. colour, shape, size) with the items that are 
the main focus of attention (Neisser and Becklen, 1975; Most, Simons, Scholl and Chabris, 2000; 
Kovivisto and Revonsuo, 2008). While task-relevant items have been shown to be more likely to be 
detected as primary task complexity increases (Rensink O’Regan and Clark, 1997), so too does the 
likelihood of an unexpected item going undetected (Cartwright-Finch and Lavie, 2007). Taken 
together, these findings support the notion of participants applying a feature-based attentional set 
when completing dynamic tasks. When task demands increase, through introduction of a secondary 
task, information which is incongruent to the primary task can go undetected. However, unexpected 
items which are personally salient to participants, such as their name or a smiley face, appear to ‘pop 
out’ and grab attention (Mack and Rock, 1998) supporting the suggestion of semantic-based 
attentional sets. If this is the case, it is easy to see how a personally-salient stimulus, such as a 
personalised alert tone from a phone, could capture a driver’s attention. 
 
Fisher and Strayer’s (2014) SPIDER information processing model highlights the cognitive processes 
that can be impaired in dual tasking drivers, leading to decreased SA. They suggest that the addition of 
a secondary task can negatively affect Scanning, Predicting, Identifying, Decision making and Executing 
a Response whilst driving. To drive safely, an individual needs to adequately scan (perception) the 
scene to identify any dangers or objects that require action. This information needs to be combined 
with previous knowledge to ensure it is understood (comprehension) which feeds into the ability to 
make informed decisions regarding movements in the scene. The ability to make decisions, which 
result in executing ‘safe’ driving responses is, in turn, affected by the ability to make predictions, 
based on previous knowledge and experience, about the near future in a given driving situation 
(projection). Fisher and Strayer (2014) found that interruption to any of the SPIDER processes can 
result in degraded SA, which is brought about by a cascading effect throughout the remaining 
processes. Thus, a driver who fails to adequately scan the scene, due to answering a phone call, may 
fail to identify a pedestrian stepping off the curb, resulting in them failing to make the decision to 
brake, therefore increasing the likelihood of an accident. This model is supported by numerous 
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empirical investigations demonstrating decreased driving performance in dual tasking drivers (Strayer 
and Fisher, 2016; Gugerty and Falzetta, 2005; Lee, Morgan, Wheeler, Hulse and Dingus, 1997; Ma and 
Kaber, 2005; Parkes and Hooijmeijer, 2001). 
 
Our hypothesis is that drivers conversing on a mobile phone will attempt to cope with the resultant 
excessive processing demands by resorting to a greater use of schemas, coupled with an increased 
propensity to adopt an attentional set. The effects of dual-tasking are to exaggerate a tendency which 
is already present in undistracted drivers: i.e., to detect hazards via schema-driven attentional sets 
that are developed through experience of the driving environment. The first experiment investigates 
the extent to which dual tasking drivers employ an attentional set when asked to detect hazards. 
Based on research showing that dual tasking drivers show decreased visual awareness, it considers the 
relevance of the position in the scene of an unexpected yet personally relevant item. The second 
experiment focuses on the impact of driving events which are incongruent with expectations for 
‘normal’ driving.  
 
2. Experiment 1 
 
2.1. Method 
 
2.1.1. Participants   
Thirty participants (14 male, 16 female) from the Open University were recruited for participation via 
an e-mail campaign. They ranged in age from 17 to 51 years (M = 29.6 years, S.D = 8.5 years), all held a 
valid driving licence, had an average of 8.7 years driving experience (range 1-25 years). Participants 
were randomly assigned to a condition, but to protect against the possible confounding effect of 
driving experience (in years) comparisons between conditions were made. No significant differences in 
driver experience were found between control (M = 10.7 years, S. D. = 6.7 years) and experimental (M 
= 7.07, S. D. = 6.9) conditions (t (28) = 1.43, p >.05). All participants claimed to have normal or 
corrected to normal vision and gave full informed consent prior to taking part.  
 
2.1.2. Design 
An independent measures experimental design with two conditions was used: ‘driving’ undistracted 
(control) and dual tasking (experimental). Participants in the control condition watched short video 
clips of driving situations and were required to respond to unexpected images appearing in the scene. 
These images were either driving congruent (e.g. road signs) or driving incongruent (e.g. icons of faces, 
or ‘emoticons’). Participants in the experimental condition completed the same task whilst 
simultaneously performing a secondary task of conducting a hands free phone conversation with the 
experimenter.  
 
2.1.3. Apparatus 
 
2.1.3.1. Driving Task 
A series of thirty video clips displaying everyday driving scenarios were used. The videos were filmed 
from within a car and included engine sounds and part of the steering wheel and dashboard to give 
the illusion of being within the vehicle. Each film displayed typical driving events, such as negotiating 
junctions and roundabouts, and were filmed in a range of different urban areas when weather 
conditions were fair and visibility was clear. The clips did not contain hazardous events that would 
ordinarily require a response from a driver. However, participants were asked to watch the clips from 
the perspective of a driver being vigilant for hazards. Prior to the experiment the clips were viewed by 
5 independent assessors, who had a minimum of 10 years driving experience and were unaware of the 
aims of the study. Only those clips which were unanimously deemed not to contain an obvious hazard, 
requiring a response from a driver were included in the experiment.  Each film lasted a maximum of 60 
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seconds, and clips were divided with intervening blue screens which announced the onset of each film. 
In twenty of the films an unexpected image appeared on screen and remained present for a duration 
of 5 seconds. Ten of these images were congruent with the task of driving (e.g. road signs) and ten 
were incongruent with the driving task (e.g. icons of faces, or ‘emoticons’, as used in Mack and Rock, 
1998), see Fig. 1. All images were black and white to ensure colour-based attentional sets were not 
implemented. Half of these images were presented in the centre of the screen and half in the 
peripheral areas (5.2° from the centre, half to the left and half to the right), only one image was 
displayed in any one clip, all images were matched for size, and order of presentation of was 
randomised for each participant. Note that it was not possible to treat congruence and position 
independently, as each unexpected image appeared only once, and therefore in only one position 
(either central or peripheral). This was done to minimise the possibility of participants intentionally 
looking out for a second appearance of an unexpected image. The remaining ten clips contained no 
unexpected images. Participants were required to watch the films, from the perspective of a driver, 
and instructed to watch for potential hazards. Participants pressed a button on a key pad if they saw 
an unexpected image appear during any of the clips.  
 
The videos were digitally projected onto a 3m x 2m screen, at a refresh rate of 60 Hz. Participants 
were tested individually and sat 2m in front of the screen in a driving simulator apparatus, comprising 
steering wheel and accelerator and brake pedals. The key pad for responding to images was 
positioned on the steering wheel and when pressed recorded participant reaction time, in 
milliseconds, from the onset of each appearing image. Half of the participants completed this task 
without distraction and half were required to complete a concurrent conversation task (see below). 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.1: Representative examples of congruent (left) and incongruent (right) central images. 
 
A video-based approach was used in this investigation largely due to ethical considerations regarding 
participant safety. Due to the distraction imposed on participants in the dual tasking condition, on 
road investigation would present a significant safety risk. Whilst future simulator-based investigations 
would be beneficial, the lab-based video approach taken here allows for greater experimental control. 
Stimuli of this type are frequently used in distracted driving research, and have also been used for 
investigations specifically focusing on situational awareness (e.g. Underwood, 2002) and schema 
(Borowsky et al., 2012). Whilst a fully immersive driving environment may offer greater ecological 
validity in terms of activation of driving schema or attentional set, the current set up replicated key 
aspects of driving (e.g. monitoring the scene, searching for hazards, reacting to unexpected events) as 
well as the driving environment (e.g. use of driving seat, pedals and steering wheel and large 
projection of the driving scene).  
 
2.1.3.2. Conversation Task 
Participants in the dual tasking condition were asked to hold a conversation with the experimenter on 
the topic of anti-social behaviour. This topic was selected as, at the time of data collection, it was an 
issue which most individuals were aware of and one which most people felt happy to discuss. For the 
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purposes of maintaining consistent levels of conversation throughout presentation of the films, 
information regarding legislation was gathered and formed into questions. Participants then held a 
conversation on this topic with the experimenter (who was out of sight of the participant, positioned 
1m behind them). Performance in this task was not recorded, as it was merely intended as a 
distraction from the primary ‘driving’ task, however the experimenter used prompts throughout to 
ensure consistent, active engagement in the conversation by participants. 
 
2.1.4. Procedure 
Prior to data collection ethical approval was granted for the investigation by the ethics board of The 
Open University. Participants completed the experiment individually in a 40-minute session. After 
providing informed consent, they were randomly assigned to a ‘driving’ condition: undistracted (no 
conversation task) or dual tasking (with conversation task). They were then informed that they would 
see a series of short clips of driving scenes, which they should watch from the perspective of a driver, 
looking for hazards (as noted above, no hazards were presented). Participants were told that some of 
the clips may show images appearing, and if they detected an image they should press the button on 
the steering wheel. After making a response, the rest of the clip would continue to play, before 
moving to the next film. Those in the dual tasking condition were told that they would also be asked to 
have a conversation with the experimenter whilst completing the ‘driving’ task. These participants 
were told that their primary task was responding to the driving task, but that the experimenter would 
prompt them to respond to the conversation throughout. To ensure that participants also followed 
the content of the driving films, they were instructed that they would be asked some questions about 
their content at the end of the experiment. Participants were then given a chance to complete a series 
of 5 practice trials, before progressing to complete the full experiment. On completion, participants 
answered some brief questions on their driving experience before being debriefed. 
 
3. Results 
 
3.1. Number of unexpected images detected 
 
A 2 (‘driving’ condition) x 4 (type of unexpected image, combining congruence/incongruence and 
central/peripheral positioning) mixed ANOVA revealed a significant difference in number of images 
reacted to dependent on ‘driving condition, F (1, 28) = 23.33, p < .001, Ƞp2
 = .45, with undistracted 
participants detecting more images than their dual tasking counterparts (see Fig. 2). A significant main 
effect of type of unexpected image was also found, F (3, 84) = 8.17, p < .001, Ƞp2= .23, as well as an 
interaction between the two, F (3, 84) = 3.37, p < .05, Ƞp2= .11. Post hoc tests revealed significant 
differences in dual taskers between congruent images presented in the centre and in the periphery (p 
< .01), as well as between congruent images presented in the centre and incongruent images 
presented in the periphery (p < .001), and incongruent images presented in the centre and those 
presented in the periphery (p < .05), see Fig. 2 
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Figure 2: Mean number of images detected dependent on position and congruency of item. Error bars show standard error. 
 
As shown above, undistracted participants responded to more images than dual tasking participants 
across conditions of position and congruency of images. Dual tasking participants, however, detected 
fewer images presented in the peripheral areas, and detection was lessened more so for incongruent 
images. Whilst no significant difference was found between congruent and incongruent images 
presented in the centre, for either undistracted or dual tasking participants, dual taskers detected 
fewer incongruent central images than congruent central items. 
 
3.2. Reaction times for detection of images 
 
For each of the images presented, the participant’s reaction time (in milliseconds) was calculated from 
the latency between their button press and the actual time in the clip when the image first appeared. 
As dual tasking participants reacted to fewer images than their undistracted counterparts, only those 
events which gained responses from comparable numbers of participants in each condition were 
included in the analysis. From the 20 clips presented, 4 were excluded from analysis on this basis (two 
were congruent peripheral, one was congruent central and another was incongruent peripheral).  
 
Individual independent t-tests were carried out on reaction time data for the remaining 16 clips. For 
the congruent images, significant differences in reaction times between undistracted and dual tasking 
participants were found for 3 of the 7 clips: clip 1, congruent centre, t (24) = 4.73, p < .001, r = .22; clip 
3, congruent peripheral, t (28) = -4.66, p < .001, r = .17; clip 6, congruent peripheral t (28) = -1.62, p < 
.001, r = .06, see Fig. 3a. In all cases, dual tasking participants took longer to react than undistracted 
participants. For the incongruent images, all of the 9 clips analysed revealed significant differences in 
reaction times between undistracted and dual tasking participants, with dual taskers taking longer to 
react than undistracted participants, see Fig. 3b. 
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(a) Congruent images 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) Incongruent images 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. (a and b) Mean reaction times for (a) congruent and (b) incongruent images dependent on condition and location of 
image. Error bars who standard error. * = sig difference from undistracted participants at p < .05, ** = Sig. difference from 
undistracted participants at p < .01, ***= sig. difference from undistracted participants at p < .001. 
 
As shown in Fig. 3, dual tasking participants took significantly longer to react to some congruent 
images, and all incongruent images, than undistracted participants. The longest reaction times were 
recorded for incongruent images presented in the peripheral areas.  
 
4. Conclusions 
 
These findings suggest that dual tasking participants were more likely to detect and react to images 
which matched the attentional set of driving (i.e. congruent images), when they were presented in the 
centre of the scene. Moreover, the dual-tasking participants were less likely than undistracted 
participants to react to images presented in the peripheral areas, particularly when the images were 
incongruent to the driving task. When incongruent images were detected, reaction times were 
significantly longer for dual tasking participants. One interpretation of these findings is that whilst all 
participants appeared to employ an attentional set for detecting driving-congruent images, the 
attentional set adopted by dual tasking drivers reduced further their ability to detect and react to 
unexpected items (driving-incongruent images) in the driving scene. Experiment 2 further investigates 
this tentative conclusion by measuring reactions of dual tasking drivers to unexpected yet driving 
relevant events.  
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5. Experiment 2 
 
5.1. Method 
 
5.1.1. Participants   
Thirty participants (11 male, 19 female) from the University of Sussex were recruited for participation 
via an e-mail campaign. Participants received course credits for their involvement in the study and 
ranged in age from 18 to 32 years (M= 22.20 years, S.D = 4.4 years). All participants held a valid driving 
licence, had an average of 6.2 years driving experience (range 1-15 years). Participants were randomly 
assigned to a condition, but to protect against the possible confounding effect of driving experience 
(in years) comparisons between conditions were made. No significant differences in driver experience 
were found between control (M =6.7 years, S. D. = 3.8 years) and experimental (M = 5.7, S. D. = 4.7) 
conditions (t (28) = 0.64, p >.05). All participants claimed to have normal or corrected to normal vision 
and gave full informed consent prior to taking part 
  
5.1.2. Design 
This study used an independent measures experimental design with two conditions: undistracted 
(control) and dual tasking (experimental). Undistracted participants watched short video clips of 
driving situations and responded to unexpected events within those clips. Dual tasking participants 
completed the same task whilst simultaneously performing a secondary task of holding a conversation 
with the experimenter.  
 
5.1.3. Apparatus 
 
5.1.3.1. Driving Task 
A series of twenty video clips filmed from within a car were used. As in Experiment 1, these films 
incorporated part of the dashboard, contained engine noises, and were filmed in a range of urban 
road environments in fair weather conditions. Ten of the driving films showed typical driving 
situations, such as changing lanes, turning at a junction, etc. and the remaining ten films depicted 
events which are plausible but generally unexpected in ‘normal’ driving (i.e. which contradict a driver’s 
expectations), such as stopping at a green traffic light or giving way when the driver has priority1. Half 
of the clips showed the unexpected event in the centre of the scene and half had an event in the 
periphery (either to the left of the right). Prior to use in the experiment, all clips were viewed by 5 
independent assessors, who had a minimum of 10 years driving experience and were unaware of the 
aims of the study. Only those films which were unanimously deemed to represent events which run 
contrary to normal driving expectations were used in the experiment. Participants were required to 
watch the clips, from the perspective of a driver, and press a button if they detected an unexpected 
event. Each film lasted a maximum of 60 seconds, and clips were divided with intervening blue screens 
which announced the onset of each film. As in Experiment 1, participants sat in a driving simulator set 
up and the films were digitally projected onto a 3m x 2m screen. The same method of recording 
participant reactions was also used.  
  
 
 
                                                 
1 The full list of unexpected events is as follows: Event one = failing to move when traffic light turns green 
(peripheral); Event two = giving way when driver has priority (central); Event three = fast approach behind a 
stationary vehicle (central); Event four = stopping flow of traffic to allow a car to pull out (peripheral); Event five 
= swerving into the bike lane (central); Event six = stopping at a green traffic light (central); Event seven = 
allowing a van to pull out at the last minute (peripheral); Event eight = giving way on a roundabout when driver 
has priority (peripheral); Event nine = stopping at an empty zebra crossing (central); Event ten = a cyclist swerves 
into driver’s lane (peripheral).  
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5.1.3.2. Conversation Task 
The same conversation task as in Experiment 1 was used. Performance in this task was not recorded, 
but prompts were used by the experimenter to ensure continued engagement with the conversation 
task for dual tasking participants. 
 
5.1.4. Procedure 
Prior to data collection ethical approval was granted for the experiment by the ethics board of The 
University of Sussex. Each participant completed the experiment individually, in a 30-minute session. 
After having completed a consent form, they were randomly assigned to a condition (undistracted or 
dual tasking). Participants were informed that they would be shown a series of driving clips, which 
they should watch from the perspective of a driver, and should react if something unexpected 
occurred in the film. Participants made their response by pressing a button on the steering wheel in 
front of them, and were made aware that after pressing the button the remainder of the clip would 
continue to play. Those in the experimental condition were asked to concurrently hold a conversation 
with the experimenter. These participants were informed that their primary task was to watch and 
react to the driving films. On completion of the driving task, participants provided brief information on 
their driving experience before being debriefed. 
 
6. Results 
 
6.1. Number of Unexpected Events Detected 
 
A signal detection analysis was carried out on the number of unexpected events detected. This was 
chosen as a more representative measure of overall detection performance, as not all participants 
reacted to all of the individual events presented. The resulting d-prime score is a composite measure 
of performance which takes into account both correct responses (correctly-detected events) and 
errors (missed events). An independent t-test was then calculated with d-prime score as the 
dependent variable, revealing a significant difference in number of events reacted to between the two 
conditions, t (28) = 17.13, p < .001, r = .08. Undistracted participants (M = .61, S.D. = .04) 
demonstrated better detection of unexpected events than those who were dual tasking (M = .46, S.D. 
= .03). These findings suggest that distraction significantly impaired detection of unexpected, driving 
congruent, events.  
 
6.2. Reaction Times for Unexpected Events 
 
As with Experiment 1, for each of the clips presented the participant’s reaction time (in milliseconds) 
was calculated from the actual time in the clip when the unexpected event began to occur. As dual 
tasking participants reacted to fewer images than their undistracted counterparts, only those events 
which gained responses from comparable numbers of participants from each condition were included 
in analysis. From the 10 clips containing unexpected events 5 were excluded from analysis on this 
basis (across all of these clips, response rates for undistracted participants greatly outweighed those 
made by dual taskers). From these 5 clips, participants responded to more unexpected events 
presented in the centre of the scene (4 events) than those presented in the periphery (1 event). 
 
Reaction time data for the remaining five events (four central, one peripheral)  were analysed using 
individual independent t-tests, revealing significant differences across all events, (event 2, central, 
giving way when driver has priority, t (21) = -4.53, p < .001, r = .03; event 3, central, fast approach 
behind a stationary vehicle, t (26) = -4.30, p < .001, r = .68; event 4, peripheral, stopping flow of traffic 
to allow a car to pull out, t (19) = -1.89, p < .001, r = .19; event 5, central, swerving into the bike lane, t 
(23) = -7.97, p < .001, r = .68; event 9, central, stopping at an empty zebra crossing, t (25) = -3.14, p < 
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.01, r = .29). In all cases, undistracted participants responded more quickly to events than dual tasking 
participants, see Fig. 4. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Mean reaction times for unexpected events across ‘driving’ conditions. Error bars show standard error. 
 
The finding that all but one of the unexpected events, which gained enough responses to allow 
analysis, appeared in the centre of the scene suggests that dual tasking drivers were most likely 
focussing their visual attention directly ahead of them. The one peripheral event which was more 
reliably reacted to involved a halt in the flow of traffic to allow a vehicle to enter the carriageway, 
while the other peripheral events which were missed were largely unaccompanied by a change in the 
participant’s course of action.  
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
These findings demonstrate that dual tasking participants may show an overreliance on their 
expectations for ‘normal’ driving situations, as they detected fewer unexpected driving related events, 
and took significantly longer to react to events they did detect than undistracted participants. Dual 
tasking participants were more likely to notice and react to unexpected events presented at the centre 
of the scene; even so, they still took significantly longer to react to such events than did the 
undistracted participants. Failure to detect peripheral events when dual tasking is a common finding in 
research of this type, adding weight to the suggestion that dual tasking contributes to cognitive and 
visual tunnelling (Recarte and Nunes, 2000; Briggs et al., 2016).  
 
8. General discussion 
 
The combined results of the current investigation support the notion of drivers employing schemas 
and attentional sets when completing a driving task, which differentially affect their situation 
awareness (SA). All drivers noticed more driving-congruent (schema-congruent) events than 
incongruent events. However, when a secondary task was introduced, it appears that the attentional 
set of drivers altered further, to the extent that very few incongruent events were identified, 
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particularly when they were in the peripheral areas of the scene. When unexpected events were 
relevant to the primary task, but ran contrary to expectations of ‘normal’ driving, dual tasking 
participants demonstrated decreased detection of events and again took longer to react to those 
events they did detect. These findings suggest that the attentional set applied by dual tasking ‘drivers’ 
is either different from that employed by undistracted participants, or that the added distraction of 
the secondary task negatively affected the application of the attentional set. Thus, dual tasking drivers 
may demonstrate an over-reliance on their expectations and, despite decreased awareness of aspects 
of the driving scene, continue to apply their original attentional set even when attentional resources 
are shared between two concurrent tasks. 
 
The decreased performance in detection and reaction times for events can be explained in relation to 
both the SPIDER model (Fisher and Strayer, 2014) and SA (Endsley, 1995; Smith and Hancock, 1995).  
The reduced ability of dual tasking participants to notice and react to events (particularly in the 
peripheral areas) suggests failures in effective scanning of the scene and identification of items 
requiring a reaction. The decreased tendency to notice events meant that either a response was not 
made or, if it was, took significantly longer to be employed, supporting Fisher and Strayer’s (2014) 
suggestion that failure in one aspect of the model can cascade throughout the other processes. 
Together, these findings suggest flaws in the perception and comprehension stages of a complete SA 
mental model. In Experiment 2, issues of perception and comprehension are also apparent for dual 
tasking participants, where an overreliance on expectations, based on past experiences, meant that 
unexpected yet driving relevant events were not identified, preventing informed decision making and 
the execution of an appropriate reaction to the event. Explanations for these findings can also be 
couched in terms of schema-driven processing (Neisser, 1976; Norman and Shallice, 1986) leading to a 
reduced awareness of the situation (Smith and Hancock, 1995) which can in turn contribute to 
decreased dual tasking performance (Bergen et al., 2013). 
 
The results are also consistent with previous research on inattentional blindness (Mack and Rock, 
1998), demonstrating further that when attention is divided or shifted between tasks, detection of 
unexpected items decreases, even when they should be personally salient to participants (e.g. smiley 
faces). Most and Astur’s (2007) feature-based attentional set suggestion is supported by the findings 
of Experiment 1, where more driving-relevant items (road signs) were detected than driving-
incongruent items. The suggestion that attentional sets can be semantic, rather than just feature-
based (Pammer and Blink, 2012) is also supported by this investigation. The finding that dual tasking 
participants, in Experiment 2, failed to notice unexpected yet driving-relevant events supports the 
notion of an attentional set based on an understanding of what ‘normally’ occurs in these situations, 
rather than simple failure to detect specific objects (e.g. a green traffic light). Thus, whilst all drivers 
may employ an attentional set whist driving, which can be both semantic and feature-based, the 
introduction of a secondary task may lead to a schema-driven attentional strategy which is 
unreceptive to unexpected events in the driving scene (Parkes and Hooijmeijer, 2001; Fracker, 1988). 
This finding is relatively surprising given that participants were informed that there might be 
unexpected events in the ‘driving’ task, and were therefore primed to look out for such events, 
suggesting that their attentional set should have incorporated this information (Jones and Endsley, 
1996).  Regardless, in line with Most and Astur’s (2007) investigation, dual tasking participants were 
more likely to miss critical events in the driving scene, suggesting perhaps that decreases in SA, 
brought about by dual tasking, automatically occur with the adoption of schema-driven processing, 
and only with consciously applied effort and allocation of attentional resources will SA improve (as 
proposed by Young and Stanton, 2002, and supported by Hockey, 1997).  
 
As mentioned in the introduction, the behavioural consequences of using a mobile phone whilst 
driving are well-documented, but the processes underpinning these ‘symptoms’ remain to be 
elucidated (Young, Salmon and Cornelissen, 2013). An analysis of dual-tasking in terms of SA can 
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explain a number of phenomena. Firstly, it helps to explain why so many drivers believe that they are 
capable of using a mobile phone while driving (Lesch and Hancock, 2004). Surveys suggest that whilst 
drivers notice that other drivers are impaired when using a phone, they consider their own driving to 
be unaffected. This may be partly due to the pervasive existence of ‘self-serving bias’, an inflated 
assessment of one's own abilities compared to other peoples’, yet if drivers have reduced SA while 
dual-tasking, they may well remain unaware of their own impairment. They simply fail to notice 
unexpected hazards and hence receive no feedback about their poor driving except when an accident 
actually occurs. This false self-assessment will be reinforced by the fact that most of the time, using a 
mobile phone whilst driving will have no obvious detrimental consequences: driving is fairly 
predictable, and so compensating for reduced SA by falling back on well-established schemata will 
often suffice. Another explanation may lie in Stanton et al's (2006) concept of ‘Distributed Situation 
Awareness’. We have considered SA from the viewpoint of the individual driver, but if one considers 
SA at the level of the entire road system, we can think of it being shared amongst the drivers in a given 
locale at any time. This makes for a forgiving system: if one driver has reduced SA because they are 
distracted, then other drivers with fuller SA can compensate for the distracted drivers' impairment, so 
that there are no adverse consequences. In short, other drivers can make allowances for the 
distracted drivers' poor driving, by giving them a wider berth if their lane-keeping is erratic, assessing 
which way the non-signalling distracted driver is likely to turn, based on that driver's road positioning, 
and so on. Accidents will only occur when the distributed SA cannot cope with the situation - for 
example, when someone steps off the pavement unexpectedly, or a driver stops at a green filter light 
instead of proceeding through it. Here, everything depends on the SA of the individual driver nearest 
the event. Normal driving consists of ‘long periods of sub-critical demand interspersed with moments 
of crucial response, or hours of boredom and moments of terror’ (Hancock, Lesch & Simmons, 2002, p. 
503): thus a mobile phone-using driver with reduced SA can probably manage quite well on the basis 
of schema-driven behaviour until something unexpected happens - in which case an accident is likely 
to ensue. 
 
8.1. Methodological limitations 
 
The use of a video-based approach to investigate the attentional set employed by participants is open 
to criticism in terms of the degree to which participants consider the task of detecting unexpected 
events as personally important or critical. For this reason, the results need to be treated with caution 
and it would be beneficial to replicate these investigations using a more realistic and actively 
controlled driving simulator, or an on-road task. Whilst our approach allows for a focused investigation 
into detection of unexpected events, it does not necessarily adequately represent all of the processes 
required, and associated workload experienced in real driving situations. Our approach cannot, for 
example, simulate the full deployment of a schema as this would involve some kind of action 
component. However, in principle many of the properties of schemata can still be investigated even if 
the schema does not run its full course. For example, event nine in Experiment two showed a car 
stopping at an empty zebra crossing. In terms of the SPIDER model, this clip initially activates an 
‘actions to take at a pedestrian crossing’ schema, based on previous experience. The schema begins 
with Scanning the video for driving-relevant features such as pedestrian crossings.  It involves 
Predicting, in the sense that pedestrian crossings often have pedestrians nearby, waiting to cross: if 
there are pedestrians, then the car in front may stop to let them cross; if there are not, the car in front 
will probably carry on at its present speed. The next process is Identifying: if there are no pedestrians, 
the car ahead is unlikely to decelerate or brake; however, if there are pedestrians waiting to cross, the 
car in front is likely to stop.  In normal driving, Decision making should then follow. In Norman and 
Shallice's (1986) model, this part of the schema could be handled fairly automatically by the 
contention scheduling system, on the basis of environmental triggers and two fairly simple IF-THEN 
rules: IF pedestrians are present THEN prepare to stop the car, versus IF there are no pedestrians 
THEN continue to drive. Only the very last part of the schema, Executing a Response, is not simulated 
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in our study. In real driving, this would involve using the vehicle controls to either maintain progress or 
halt the car, depending on the presence or absence of pedestrians. Our participants did execute a 
response (pressing a button) but of course this is not the usual response that would be made by a 
driver in a real car. For our purposes, this is not a crucial problem; both distracted and undistracted 
participants have, in effect, been asked to substitute a button press for the normal chain of events 
that are executed as part of the schema. If there are no differences between the two groups, they 
should be similarly affected by this response-substitution (and should produce similar hazard 
detection and hazard response times). The fact that the distracted participants were significantly 
poorer at this task is consistent with a prediction of schema theory, at least as outlined in Norman and 
Shallice's (1986) model. One interpretation is as follows: both groups of participants initially rely on 
the contention scheduling system to ‘choose’ between the two competing responses ordinarily 
activated as part of this schema. When it suddenly becomes apparent that this schema is not 
progressing in its normal way, the Central Executive has to step in and assume control, abandoning the 
schema as a means to execute behaviour. This takes time, but is much quicker for the undistracted 
participants because they are less heavily reliant on the schema in the first place.  
 
Further improvement could be made by increasing the sample sizes for each experiment in this 
investigation. This would be of particular advantage when analysing the reaction time data for the 
unexpected events in Experiment 2 where only half of the events had enough responses from dual 
tasking participants to enable meaningful analyses. In all cases of items excluded from analysis, the 
majority of dual tasking participants failed to react at all to the event. Whilst it could be claimed that 
this is purely due to the experimental manipulation being highly effective, the limited number of 
experimental trials call this conclusion into question. Furthermore, as there were relatively few events 
which could be analysed for reaction time differences between conditions their results cannot 
necessarily be considered representative of typical behaviour.  
 
When looking at the specific events contained in those clips which did return enough responses to 
allow analysis, it appears that most of them were more relevant to affecting the continuing progress 
of the driver (e.g. giving way when driver has priority, stopping flow of traffic to allow a car to pull out, 
stopping at an empty zebra crossing). Conversely, dual tasking participants did not all reliably react to 
events which may have increased the time available to them to effectively dual task, temporarily 
reducing overall cognitive workload (e.g. failing to move when traffic light turns green, and giving way 
on a roundabout when driver has priority). Whilst it is possible that the types of event presented may 
have differentially allowed dual taskers to switch attention between tasks, this was not controlled for 
in the original design and therefore cannot be assumed. Another possibility is differences in the 
positioning and salience of the unexpected events, which could affect reaction rates; these were 
combined into a single factor for Experiment 1 and it may be informative to replicate the experiment 
with stimuli that allow them to be treated as separate variables. Future investigations could also 
benefit from questioning participants after completion of the procedure as a measure of the 
importance they place on safety in specific driving situations (e.g. speed of approach, lane discipline, 
etc.), as well as taking additional measures of SA. An alternative method to investigate participants' 
reliance on schemas might be to use Jackson, Chapman and Crundall's (2009) ‘what happens next?’ 
procedure, where video clips are stopped before a hazard fully unfolds and participants have to say 
what was likely to happen, based on what had happened so far. One might expect distracted 
participants to produce predictions that were much more schema-based than those of undistracted 
participants. 
 
8.2.  Future investigations 
 
The current investigation has revealed that drivers may routinely adopt an attentional set for 
processing aspects of the driving scene. When dual tasking, the reliance on this schema-driven 
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attentional set may be increased to the extent that the driver’s situation awareness is diminished, 
which could impair task performance. Further investigation is, however, required to ascertain the 
effects of different types and positioning of unexpected events. Given the assumption of reduced 
scanning capabilities of dual tasking participants, a measurement of eye movements would provide 
useful confirmation. This would also allow for investigation of overall variance in eye movements of 
participants, which could add further understanding as to why some unexpected yet driving relevant 
events went undetected. Further, as the current investigation had clear goals set for participants (i.e. 
detection of images/events), more natural driving activities should be investigated where goals may 
change during the course of the trial (e.g. changing route, imposing time limits, etc.). Such an 
approach may allow for a more rounded measure of SA than simply event detection and reaction time 
data. Additionally, as the assumption is made that attentional set can differentially affect SA, 
especially whilst dual tasking, investigation into individual differences in capability of maintaining an 
up-to-date mental model of a situation may be beneficial, with measures of working memory capacity 
being a logical starting point. 
 
If the attentional set employed by a driver can be affected by the introduction of a secondary task, 
interventions aimed at increasing driver education regarding dual tasking should be considered. Many 
drivers may be surprised to learn that they routinely employ shortcuts in their attention allocation 
strategies when they are driving without distraction. However, the introduction of a secondary task, 
which may demand resources already allocated to the driving task, can further significantly impair 
performance in detection of and reaction to critical driving events. Changes to the hazard perception 
test, currently completed by all learner drivers, could address some of these issues. The inclusion of 
hazards which run contrary to expectations, along with information on how attention is allocated 
whilst driving, could contribute to improved safety awareness. Application of these findings to current 
use of information signs for drivers could also prove interesting. Many digital overhead road signs are 
routinely used for varying purposes (e.g. warning of forthcoming congestion as well as general safety 
messages, e.g. ‘seatbelts save lives’). Future research which assesses driver attentional set and the 
effectiveness of such multi-use signs may be beneficial, with particular focus on whether the changing 
use of signs alters a driver’s expectations and attentional set.  
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